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A familiar complaint against General Equilibrium theory is
that i,t is unrealistic or bears insufficient relation to economic·
reality.

This sort of charge, however, is of questionable value,

since all theories are to an extent unrealistic, and since criteria for sufficient theoretical approximation of reality appear
unavailable.

Indeed, recent preoccupation a.Qng methodologists

with the Kuhn-type concern that the competition among

parad~qms

may be inherently irresolvable suggests that the idea of a theory's
approximation of reality might be either incoherent or at best
w~thout

practical implication.

This post-Kant ian

vie~,

that is,

accepts the proposition that theory largely dictates the very
character of reality, such that adjudication between incommensurable well-developed theories .is all but impossible.
In this paper, it is maintained that the complacency with
which these conclusions are defended derives from an uncritical
acceptance of the traditional analysis of reference implicit in
the post-Kantian philosophical tradition.

That since the early

1970s this traditional theory has been subjected to powerful
criticism by a number of philosophers, moreover, suggests that it
is no longer reasonable to ignore the question of sufficient
theoretical approximation of reality.

Finally, should truth

indeed be determined paradigmatically, that is; ' within the context of a theory, then whether a theory can be .aid to actually
pick out objects in the world that are naaed within the theory
becomes a matter of pre-eminent impOrtance.
The question fo~ General Equilibrium theory, then, is not
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whether it bears insufficient relation to economic reality, but
rather whether it possesses a coherent and systematic analysis
of reference, that is, an analysis that allows the theory to
coherently and systematically pick out objects in the world which
are named within the theory.

Should, in resistance to the posing

of this question, it be claimed by General Equilibrium theorists
that such a matter is extra-economic and essentially philosophic,
two responses are in order.

First, since virtually everyone

would deny that General Equilibrium theory bears no relation to
economic reality whatsoever, it must bear some such relation,
and thus at least implicitly presupposes some analysis of reference which is accordingly subject to examination.

Second, as

will be argued below, the axiomatic character of General Equilibrium theory reveals this implicit analysis to be very much a form
of the traditional view of reference recently subjected to important criticism.

First, then, what is the traditional view of

reference?
'
utilizes the Kantian
2
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments to establish

The traditional view of reference
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how and when a name (common noun or proper name) successfully
picks out the object in the world to which it is meant to refer.
In particular, the traditional view explains the meaning of a
name, or the concept of the object in question, in terms of the
properties analytically true of the name and thus essential or
necessary to ~he object n~ed.
most critics of this conception:

In the words of one of the fore-
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On the traditional view, the meaninq of
say, "lemon," is given by specifyin~ a
conjunction of properties. For each of
these properties, the statement "lemons
have the property P" is an analytic truth~
and if PI' P 2 , · • . . . P n are all of the
properties in the conjunction, then -anything with ' all of the properties PI' •
P n is a lemon" is likewise an analytic
truth (Putnam, 1970, 51).
The conjunction of properties associated with a name is generally
called the intension of . the name. _ The extension 6f the name,
on the other hand, is represented by the object or , objects the'
name picks out.

,While some versions of the theory argue that

proper application of a name allows for less than the full conjunction of properties analytically true of that name--a 'cluster
of properties 3 --in all other respects the relationship between
the intension and extension of a name -is preserved.

On this

view, then, the intension of a name determines its extension, or,
simply, meaning determines reference.
Thus, whereas Kant had claimed that knowledge of the world
is structured by the character of the human

mi~,

the traditional

view of reference requires that the meanings inherent in lan,g uage
dictate what can be picked out in the world.

Kant's account in

terms of judgments and concepts pos.es.es an unnecessarily
psychological flavor from the modern point of view, and moreover,
his treatment of judgment appears ambiguous between the act
judging and what is judged.

If" however, his

~nalysis

of

is

restricted to an 'a ccount of what is judged, namely, propositions
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or statements, the psychological character of concepts or meanings is replaced by their propositional or linguistic character.
The traditional view of reference, then, is essentially consistent
with the Kantian approach in that it characterizes a system of
representation, linguistic rather than psychological, in terms
that permit identification of that about which certainty is
possible, namely, analytical truths about concepts and -their
properties.

In contrast, the new view of reference,4 which has

emerged through recent critique of the traditional view, main- tains that there are necessary truths about objects in the world
that are not known in virtue of analytical truths about the conceptsof those objects and their properties, and, as a matter of
historical or acientific fact, extension, or how things come to
be named, as often as not, determines intension, or the concept
or meaning associated with a name.

Before examining this new

view and its critique of the traditional approach, however, it
is important to elicit the implicit reliance of General Equilibrium
theory upon the traditional account of reference.
General Equilibrium theory is largely coextensive with the
theory of value of a competitive economy.

In Debreu's words,

two problema are central to this theory and thereby constitute
its character, they are:
(1) the explanation of the prices of
coanoditiea resulting from the interaction
of t~e agents o~ a private ownership economy
through markets, (2) the explanation of the
role of prices in an optimal state of any
economy (Debreu, ix).
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Though Walras and Pareto produced solutions to these problems,
the formal structure of General Equilibrium theOry has only
been demonstrated relatively recently, beginning with the work
of Wald in the 1930s in connection with the first problem, and
continuing with the work of Koopmans after 1950 in connection
S
with the second.
It is fair to say, therefore, that the proper
form for General Equilibrium theory is the axiomatic one that
dominates the concerns of contemporary General Equilibrium
theorists.

However, it is this axiomatic form which imposes

the traditional theory of reference on General Equilibrium theory.
The axiomatic method, broadly speaking, links postu"iates
or assumptions to particular conclusions by a' chain of logical
deductions.

In General Equilibrium theory these assumptions

concern the fundamental concepts, of the competitive economy,
namely, commodity, price, producer, production plan, the set of
possible production plans, consumer, consumption plan, the set
of possible consumption plans, preferences,wealth, total resources,
the economy, a private ownership economy, equilibrium and the
optimum (Debreu; 28, 37, SO, 74, 7S, 79, 83, 90).

While attention

to the deductive character of the analysis commonly dominates
interest in its axiomatic formulation, from the present point of
view, the crucial element of the method concernB the determination
of its concepts, since it is these components', via their designa-"
tions or names ("commodity," "price," etc.) 'that pick out or '
refer to actual individuals or objects in the world.

Indeed, it '

would certainly be unpromising to question the deductive structure
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of General gquilibrium theory in light of its extensive examination and the confidence generally invested in the laws of logic.
In contrast, little attention has been devoted to the philosophical
character of General Equilibrium theory concept determination and
its impact on the referential capacity of the theory.•
To see, then, that the formulation of concepts in General
Equilibrium theory reflects the traditional theory of reference,
recall that the distinctive feature of the latter, as expressed
by Putnam, is that the properties of a concept are all analytically
and thus a priori true of that concept ("the statement 'lemons have
the property P' is an analytic truth").

The argument here, thus,

is that the axiomatic character of General Equilibrium theory requires that properties true of concepts be treated as analytically
true of those concepts.

It is important to emphasize that this is

the effect rather than the intent of General Equilibrium theory,
since the mathematical philosophy of its proponents is . specifically
formalist (Debreu, x).

Formalism derives from Kant through Hilbert,

and asserts that the truths of mathematic are not analytic.

More

generally, formalism is the view that mathematical systems are
essentially to be regarded as nothing but formalized systems, or
that as systems of symbolic relations they possess their validity
independently of any interpretation of their symbols. 6 How, then,
are the connection. between properties and concepts to be regarded
as analytic, or, how is it that a property ascribed to a given
concept is par~ of the mea~ing of the latter in General Equilibrium
theory?
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In the first place, unlike most formalist . mathematical
systems, ax;omatic General Equilibrium theory Goes not pretend
to be indeterminate of application or fully independent of theorem
interpretation.

On the contrary, as noteQ above, virtually all

General Equilibrium theorists would deny that the theory bears
no relation whatsoever to economic reality, and mostwQuld insist in fact that it does bear some such -r elation.

Specifically,

in its solution to its two centr.a l problems, General Equilibrium
theory purports to characterize important features ' of a market
economy.

Yet if this is the case, then though the

pr~perties

ascribed to various concepts are not ostensibly a priori

analyti~

cally true of those concepts, nonetheless the successful completion
of the proofs for the existence and optimality of equilibriUm
requires that these properties be so ,ascribed to their concepts . .
For example, preferences must be convex in the ar9ument
concerning consumers and demand for tbe
issue to be completed.

p~oofs

ultimately at

That preferences cannot but be convex

is tantamount to saying that the concept of preferences necessarily
includes the property of convexity--in the framework of the proofs
at hand.

Of course, were no' particular conclusion to the 'proofs

of 'existence' and 'optimality' required, or were it just as
reasonable to demonstrate nonexistence and/or non-optimality 'of
a market equilibrium, then it would not be necessary that preferences be convex.

In terms of formalist mathematical systems,

as long as application or interpretation is strictly indeterminate, ·
the propositions and theorems of the analysis need not be analytic.
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On the other band, as soon as a system is constrained to achieve
a particular result desired from the point of view of its interpretation, the relation between properties and concepts loses
its stipulative or synthetic character.

Thus if the two proofs

of General Equilibrium theory are indeed about markets, as they
are claimed to be, rather than simply about configurations of
logical symbols, as formalism implies, then it is unav,o idable
that the relation between concepts and their properties assume
an analytic character. 7
These conclusions are reinforced by consideration of an
alternative type of connection between concepts and their properties.

If properties of a concept are analytically ascribable

to it, then such relations are established a priori, that is,
apart from experience.

In contrast, properties ascribed to con-

cepts a posteriori are in some fashion discovered from experience
to be so ascribable, and accordingly it cannot be said that somehow the meaning of the concept in quest'ion includes that of the
property ascribable to it.
In General Equilibrium theory, then, it is hardly the case
that, say, preferences have been discovered to be convex.

In-

deed non-convex preferences, shou'l d they be observed, are conventionally regarded a. a departure from rational behavior, such
that the concept. of the consumer and preferences are necessarily

.

associated with convexity of preferences.

Put differently, a

nonanalytic relation between a concept and its properties can
be guaranteed by determining that relation from experience or
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a posteriori, while recourse to the concept ofa

rationalcon~

sumer by nature precludes this quarantee.
Thus, if General .E quilibrium theory does implicitly employ
the traditional analysis of reference, what are the problems
with that analysis, and how do they bear on General Equilibrium
theory itself?

Recall that on the traditional view the prpperties

true of a concept are analytically or a priori. true of that concept, and the name of that concept (e.q., ·consumer" for consumer) picks out or refers to those objects in the
deed possess those properties.

~rld

that in-

The new view of reference makes

at least four objections to this account.
First, that a given concept can be reasoned a priori to
have certain properties associated with it, does not imply that
real examples of the object des'ignated will also have those
properties.

Thus, should understanding of a concept, and there-

by the object designated by its name, change in the sense that
new or different properties are reasoned characteristic of that
concept and object, then the traditional view requires that an
altoqether new or different concept and object be the subject of
that new understanding.

But in this case, there would be no

continuity to the apparent development of understanding, since
strictly speaking it would not be appropriate to say that the
new understanding concerned the same concept and object

ex~ined

in the previous conception.
More simply, the traditional view lacks a criterion of
identity of concepts and objects across chanqes in constituting

'
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properties.

This follows from its reliance upon conceptual con-

junction (or 'clusterin:J' ) of properties for the identification
of concepts and their objects.

Loosely speaking, on a more

'realistically' oriented analysis, the world permits some continuity of objects variously conceptualized at different times
and across theories.

Though of course how this occurs is quite

problematic, it is fair to allow that some basis for crossconceptualization identity of concepts and objects is crucial
to understandin<} .and thus that it is probably mistaken to confuse what is problematic with what is impossible.

Moreover, if

property characterization of concepts and objects does not itself provide this . criterion, it is reasonable to hypothesize that
it is somehow 'qiven' by the world.

Thus, at best, the traditional

view is an entirely static account of concept constitution.
General Equilibrium theory, then, in r 'elying upon the
traditional theory of reference, is unable to identify concepts
and objects across chanqes in their conceptualization.

For ex-

ample, should consumers be found with non-convex preferences,
that is, for some reason demonstrating an increasinq marqinal
rate of substitution between goods, then these individuals cannot
be characterized .a consumers within General Equilibrium theory,
if the theory i. to continue to explain the existence and optimality
of market equilibrium.
rational, and therefore

In effect, these individuals are not
~annot

be consumers.

Accordingly,

General Equilibrium theory cannot explain consumers, but rather
only "consumers" defined in the context of the theory, given its
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implicit ~nalysis of reference. 8
Second, in most cases the properties ascribed to concepts
and objects are not a priori analytically true of those concepts
and objects, except', perhaps, in those cases in which definitions are at work.

Rather, in most cases properties' ascribed to

concepts and objects are contingently related to those concepts
and objects as a result of scientific investigation.
differently, most of what is

kno~

Put

or understood ' about objects

and their concepts has been achieved by empirical, investigation
rather than the -analysis of meanings.

That is, properties are

ascribed to concepts a posteriori rather than a priori.

Putnam

comments on this point in the course of his general cr'itique of
the traditional analysis.
What has happened is this:
the traditional
theory has taken an account which ia correct
for the ," one criterion" concepts (Le ·. , for
such concepts as ·bachelor" and ~vixen"), '
and made it a general account of the meaning
of general names. A theory which correctly
describes the behavior of perhaps three
hundred words has been asserted to correctly
describe the behavior of the tens of
thousands of gerieral names (Putnam, 1970,
56) •

The consequence, accordingly, is the mi.perception that a property arguably implicit in the meaning of a concept is also
ascribable to objects named via that concept.

However, it ~ is

a matter of practical investigation whether a property imaginably
appropriate to ~he concept of an object is in fact appr6priat~
to the concept of that object.

The traditional theory neglects
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this point.
Thus, General Equilibrium theory does not investigate
whether, say, consumers can be said to have convex preferences.
Indeed, from the point of view of the theory, there is no reason to investigate the possibility of non-convex preferences,
since they are precluded by the concept of the rational consumer.
Alternatively, the only investigation the theory permits is that
which confirms convex preferences, such that contingently
established relationships are first and foremost a priori ones.
More generally, the implicit adoption of the traditional

analy~is

of reference precludes empirical investigation for General
Equilibrium theory.

This conclusion, clearly, goes beyond any

of the familiar complaints that General Equilibrium theory 'poorly'
approximates or is 'difficult' to apply to economic reality.
The third objection to the traditional view of reference
is that i ':_ fails to distinguish attributive and referential
uses of names or identifying descriptions, and that this failure
genera't es r'3radoxical results for the view.

Donnellan is

responsible for this distinction.
A speaker who uses a 'd~finite description
attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the
.a-and-.a. A speaker who uses a definite
d.~riptioft referentially in an assertion,
on the other hand, uses the description to
enable hi. audience to pick out whom or
what he i. talking about and states something about that person or thing (Donnellan,
1966).
.
Significantly, a name or description used referentially may well
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pick out an object in the world though it in
object.

~act

mislabels that

"Smith's Murderer," thought to be Jones when Jones is

actually innocent, may successfully pick out Jones in certain
conversational contexts though mislabeling hia.

The useo£" a

label in this manner, then, does not necessarily make reference
to whomever or whatever it apparently describes.

Rather names

or labels so used pick out objects in the. world, irrespective
of their descriptive adequacy.

In contrast, the attributive use

of a name or label, which is the only use the traditional view
allows, precludes saying "Smith's Murderer" without lull knowledge of Smith's murderer.
Donnellan's distinction -c learly has considerable persuasiveness in a world of less than perfect knowledge.

Should names or

labels always pick out whatev~r or whomever they describe (the
attributive use characteristic of the traditional view), -th,n in
the presence of ignorance, little discussion between speakers
would be possible.

Moreover, those adopting different

conceptual~~a

tions could never claim to be intent upon establishing what might
be known about common subject matters, and thus, science, as
commonly understood,would itself be all but

~.sible.

In _fact,

however, conununication between tho •• adopting different characterizations of concepts and objects is not iapo. . ible, though often
difficult.

It seems fair to say, then, thAt the failure to

distinguish the different senses in which

na.e. or descriptions

can be used leads to a misunderstanding of the social character
of knowledge.
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For General Bquilibrium theory with its reliance on traditional reference, indeed, there is no incentive for communication
with those adopting different conceptualizations of, say, the
consumer, because the theory lacks any means of

ref~rring

to any-

thing but that which it captures in its own concept of the conBumer.

Indeed, because of its reliance on the traditional view

of reference, the theory only jeopardizes its very existence by
allowing that there are consumers (not ·consumers·) to discuss
' with those of different theoretical standpoints.

In contrast,

any theoretical approach that allows for the referential use of
names of concepts--and thus allows that the properties true of
concepts are contingently associated with those concepts and may
be revised--permits intertheoretical discussion of concepts such

as that of the consumer without, at the same time, threatening
the non-referential principles of the approach.

In effect systematic

debate between approaches is only possible in the framework of
a posteriori concept formulation.
The fourth objection to the traditional view of reference
is that it excludes a comprehensive and adequate conception of
necessary relationships.

In Kripke's view, it is important to

distinguish between necessary and a priori truths.
What do we aean by calling a statement necessary?
w. slaply llean that the statement in question,
first, is true, and, second, that it could not
have been otherwise. When we say something is
contingently tfue, we mean that, though it is
in ~act the case, it could have been the case
that .things would have been otherwise.
To the contrary, there is the notion of a priori
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truth. An a priori truth is supposed .to be
one which can be known to be true independently
of all experience. Notice that this does not.
in and of itself say anything about all possible
worlds, unle~s this is put into the definition
(Kripke, 1971, 136).
Necessary truths, for Kripke, are the subject aatter. 6f metaphysics, or the philosophy of what

exi~t8,

are the subject matter of epistemology.

while a priori truths

This distinction is

important, then, because it is reasonable to believe that some
things may be necessary irrespective of human knowledge.

More-

over, on Kripke's view, that which can be known apart fro~
experience and that which is necessarily the case do not overlap,
since, as he argues at length, we must discover

from~he

world

what is necessarily the case, such that what is necessary is
known to be such a posteriori.

The traditional view of reference,

accordingly, not only confuses what. is knowable apart from experience with necessary relationships, but it also fails to grasp
the genuine character of the necessary as that which must be the
case irrespective of human cognition.
The significance of ~hese points derives · from scientific
concern with the question of what is essential to an object.

In

a world of change and variability across .-bars of · any category,
success in identifying objects in .t he world depends upon detec.t ing
what may be considered essential to thea.

Difficult as it , is to

establish what may be considered essential to

~ny

object, the

need to identify and re-identify objects in the world makes sqme
conception of necessary or essential properties important ·to
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scientific reasoning.

The traditional view of reference, however,

by constituting the concept of an object via the simple conjunction of all those properties merely a priori true of that
concept, abandons any distinction between what must be held intrinsic to the concept and object and what might not be.

In

brief, the traditional view of reference is not operative in the
scientific domain in which this distinction is central.
In the case of the concept of the consumer

in General

Equilibriwr. theory, then, all the properties ascribable to the
concept of the consumer are essential to that concept with the
same a priori certainty.

Indeed, the effect of abandoning any

one of the properties of the consumer (convexity of preferences,
transitivity of preferences, etc.) is in effect the same as
abandoning any other, namely, the proofs of existence and
optimality fail.

Moreover, though the theory may fail in different

ways when different properties are abandoned, this tells nothing
about which properties are crucial to the concept .of the consumer
itself.
Given these four objections, several points summarize the
issues involved in the current controversy over reference.
concern current view. about the
p~tition

theory-la~enness

They

of facts, com-

between paradigms of different economic theories, and

the atatus of different economic paradigms.
Firat,

t~ugh

it ia commonly believed that since all facts

are theory-laden, objects in the world lack any conceptual status
independent of the theory in which they are cognized, the dis-
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cussion above implies this inference is mistaken.

Thus, 'while

it is true that facts are theory-laden, to exaggerate the sig'n ificance of this is in effect to assume that objects , in the world
are themselves altogether constituted by conCeptualization, ,and
thus to deny their objective character itself.

This, indeed,

is the inadvertent conclusion of the traditional theOry of
reference, since on the principle that meaning determines - reference
or intension determines extension, the analysts of meaning tells
us exactly what may be found in the world, and thus rules out
the possibility that what exists may be cognitively 'nailable to
us prior to its adequate theoretical characterization. '
Objects in the world, however, do posses. some conceptual
status for us independent of or prior to any developed or theorydetermined elaboration of their properties, and it is this which
makes science inherently empirical as well as conceptual.

The

traditional theory of reference, then, is incompatible with the
accepted character of science, and so inimical to a scientific
treatment of market economics.
Second, if truth itself is arguably paradiCjlll-relative, or '

1. '.

established as a property of the' statements within a theory, then
the view of refer'e nce adopted by a theory
in its evaluation.

crucial element

That is, if it is not pl.u.ible to say that

the relation of a theory's statements to the world can be assessed
in terms of the correspondence theory of

~ruth,

it is all the

more important to 'ask whether that which is named ,in the theory
can be said to systematically and coherently pick out objects in
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the world.

A theory's analysis of reference, then, is a key

means of judging competition between paradigms.

Specifically,

whether a yiven theory's concepts via their names can genuinely
be said t ·> pick out the objects in the world they are meant to
designate 6ays a great deal about the theory relative to other
theories less successful in this regard.

Indeed, if competing

theories are equally well-developed in their chains of inference,
it may be tha.t their respective capacities to refer to the world
alone distinguish them.

At the same time, the skepticism and

relativism generated by Kuhn's thinking is undermined when
differences in concept formulation in this respect are considered.
Finally, a

br~ef

glance at the main idea of the new theory

of reference provides a basis for judging the status of different
economic paradigms.

On the new view, since names are not

descriptive summaries of concepts and their . associated properties,
names come to have their referential function more or less
arbitrarily from the point of view of their
elaboration.

possi~le

meaning

Very briefly, certain things come to be 'baptised'

as such-and-such at certain points in history, and then,
irrespective of future elaboration of the associated concept,
retain their initial designation within the community of those
investigating the concept by a sort of 'referential chain'
(Putnam, 1973).

Alternatively, once a thing is labeled with a

particular name,

althoug~

the understanding of that thing

ma~

change; the name functions as a "rigid designator."9
For example, though economists have very different views
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about the concept of the vision of labor, all are mer"! or less referring to the same real world phenomenon.

Indeed, though, it may

be especially difficult ,to state in language acceptable to all just
precisely what this ,same real world phenomenon is, that economists
can disagree about the proper characterization of the division of
"labor itself implies that on the whole they refer toone thing in
,

common.

The referential capacity of different economic theories,thel

can be judged by the extent to which a theory operates ,in terms of
concepts 'given' to the subject matter by the experience' of past
naming, or, conversely, by the extent to which a theery generates it
I

own concepts in abstraction from those taken as common subject matte;
General Equilibrium theory stands ina questionable position on
this score.

While some of its concept$ have been taken from the ex-

perience of past naming "in economics at least , in name, its impiicit
analysis of reference precludes those concepts from comparative
evaluation with their formulation in other theories.

Accordingly,

the burden of proof rests upon General Equilibrium theory to demonstrate that it is concerned with the same ,concepts that preoccupy
other theories.

Failure to demonstrate this, 'of course, suggests

that General Equilibrium theory is extra-econoaic

i~

say, principally mathematical in tho •• concerns.

Indeed, the argu-

its concerns,

ment of this paper is that the implicit theory of reference inescapably associated with General Equilibriua theory makes even an
interest in comparative concept discus.ion unlikely if not
such that pract~cally, as well as theoretically, General Equilibri
theory is irremediably outside the mainstream of economics.

Footnotes
lThe chief contributors are Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell,
P. F. Stravson, and John Searle. For references and a survey of
similarities and differences of Frege, Russell, and Strawson, see
Linsky (1967a, 1967b). For Searle's ~re recent contribution, see
Searle (1958, 1969). For an introduction to the controversy over
reference, see the "Introduction" to Schwartz (1977). It should be
noted that the thinking of these individuals is neither strictly
nor uniformly post-Kantian.
2The original discussion is in Kant (1929~ 41-5, 48-51, 189191). Roughly speaking, for an analytic truth the meaning of the
predicate is somehow 'contained' in the meaning of the subject,
vhile a synthetic truth holds as a matter of fact. Kant considered
all analytic truths to be known a priori, that is, apart from . experience. Following Leibniz and Hume, Kant's distinction between
analytic a priori and synthetic a posterori truths is basically
that betwe~n necessary and contingent truths.
3Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations treatment of
family resemblances is an example of the 'cluster' notion of a concept or ~_ning.
4The three individuals most responsible for the new view are
Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and Keith Donnellan. Kripke's views
derive fr~ his understanding of identity in counter factual situations, Putnam's are associated with his scientific realism, and
Donnellan's stem from his treatment of attributive and referential
uses of identifying descriptions. However, controversy over
analyticity has been widespread since Quine (1961, 20-46).
SFor a survey of the contributions to the axiomatic analysis
of General Equilibrium theory, see Weintraub (1983).
6For a brief account of formalism in mathematics, see Black
(1965, 147-151). Black suggests that the approach has foundered
on its principle that the validity . of mathematical systems is
fully independent of their interpretation since Godel's incompleteness argument. In a fashion, the argument of this paper makes a .
similar point. That is, the desired interpretive independence of
General EqUilibrium theory, required for the formal adequacy of
the .ystam, mak•• a coherent account of the referential capacity
of the theory problematic.
'In the T~ of Value, Debreu is at best ambiguous about
the issues .ur~ln9 Interpretation of formalist systems. See
his brief remark. about the dichotomy between the axiomatic form
of the analy.is and it. interpretations (Debreu, x).
Ssee Putnam (1970) f~r this general argument. Putnam places
slightly more emph•• is on the question of "abnormal" members of a
category or, as he puts it, a "natural kind."

9This is Kripke's term. The new view do~. allow that the
understanding of some things may change so much that they are
re-named. However, for there to be any continuity in what a
developing understanding of some thing is about, an object even
to be re-named must maintain its historical tag to some extent~
That the process of re-naming makes it difficult to say in actual
cases whether the same thing is at issue does not imply that the
new view of reference is mistaken.
'
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